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On December 3rd, 2003, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) announcedthat “Ferdinand Nahimana, founder and ideologist of the Radio Télévision Libre des MilleCollines (RTLM), Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, high ranking board member of the Comité
d’initiative of the RTLM and founding member of the Coalition for the Defence of Republic (CDR),
and Hassan Ngeze, chief editor of Kangura newspaper, were convicted today for genocide,
incitement to genocide, conspiracy, and crimes against humanity, extermination and persecu-
tion.”1 In what was dubbed ‘the media trial’, the ICTR examined the role of the radio station RTLM
and the newspaper Kangura in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to address, for the first time since
the Nuremberg Trials, the role of the media in the context of international criminal justice. The
ICTR judgment echoes the 1946 judgment of the International Military Tribunal against the NS
journalist Julius Streicher, and will continue to inspire commentary on media accountability and
the status of the long-dormant 1948 UN Genocide Convention as a core element of contem-
porary international criminal justice.2,3
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But rather than approaching the controversial case as a new benchmark in the politics of
human rights, I want to explore some of its implications for the idea of an ‘interventionist’ media:
What happens to the idea of a media ‘intervention’ in the context of media incited and sustained
mass violence, when ‘intervention’ is no longer conceptualized in the subversive terms of an
autonomous counter-imperial multitude, over and against corporate mediaspheres and over-
powering states, but may have to be rearticulated in the imperial terms of an interventionist
‘peace media’ in response to violent conflict in weak or failing states? Aware of the scope of
such an effort, I offer no more than an initial research report that identifies possible vectors of
inquiry. What follows are comments on the rise of media as a new direction in humanitarian
intervention, the emergence of state failure as permanent feature of the post-colonial era 
and as conflict-analytical concern, and the increasing attention to media as autonomous actor
in conflict-analytical work, concluding with the suggestion to explore in greater detail, with 
more attention to nuance than such a short essay allows, the implications of an imperial 
humanitarian media interventionism for ‘alternative’ theories of autonomous, interventionist, and
tactical media.
New Directions in Humanitarian Intervention
Following the end of one-party rule and the establishment of a transitional coalition govern-
ment in 1992, the Hutu-dominated Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) lost
its control over Radio Rwanda. The quasi-governmental Radio Rwanda had been the only
national radio station and had already been used to broadcast a violently pro-Hutu message,
but moved toward a non-partisan agenda when moderates took over the Ministry of
Information. Radio Muhabura, a new station established by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF),
a Uganda-based rebel army composed of mostly Tutsi exiles, also followed a nationalist –
rather than ethnic – emphasis consistent with the RPF commitment to minimizing the diffe-
rences between Hutu and Tutsi. In response, Rwandan Hutu hardliners incorporated their
own radio station as RTLM and began broadcasting in 1993, circumventing the ban
imposed on ‘harmful radio propaganda’ to which the new Rwandan government had formally
committed itself. Nominally independent of Radio Rwanda, RTLM was linked in a number of
ways with the national radio, with other state agencies, and with the MRND: RTLM was
allowed to broadcast on the same frequencies as the national radio when Radio Rwanda
was not transmitting; it included well-known MRND and Radio Rwanda personnel, it used
equipment owned by various government agencies, and it had access to an emergency
source of energy. While this structural support helped to quickly extend the reach of RTLM,
its popularity had its roots in the informal, spontaneous and witty style it pioneered, includ-
ing the use of interactive broadcasting. Prior to the genocide, RTLM became popular even
among the Tutsi soldiers of the RPF. Following the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana
in a plane crash on April 6, 1994, and the subsequent seizure of power by a self-proclaimed
interim government, a systematic genocide commenced, intensifying a process of informal
repression that had already begun in 1992, orchestrated primarily by centrally-organized
militias linked to the MRND and its extremist offshoot, the CDR. Once the genocide began,
targeting minority Tutsis as well as moderate Hutus opposed to the MRND, RTLM took up
themes of the extremist press, never losing its spontaneous style that gave voice to both
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government officials and listeners, and soon displaced the paper Kangura as the most
influential voice of extremism. Eventually, Radio Rwanda came under extremist influence as
well. Taking advantage of their reach and popularity, the two ‘sister’ stations broadcast inci-
tation to slaughter and directions on how to carry it out. Throughout the genocide, the two
stations collaborated to deliver a single message about the need to extirpate the ‘enemy’,
articulated in the terms of an essentialized Hutu-Tutsi difference, of lavish praise for every-
one who took matters into his or her own hands, and of disdain for political action that fell
short of such radical extremism.4,5
The centrality of hate radio to both informal repression and the actual genocide cam-
paign did not escape international attention and, with the likelihood of an armed interven-
tion absent, raised calls for a media intervention. Early suggestions to jam RTLM by General
Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of UN forces in Rwanda, were quickly taken up
by human rights activists. But as is well known, no such media intervention occurred, in part
because of technical difficulties: after RPF forces had captured the capital, RTLM switched
to the use of mobile transmitters, whose jamming would have required precisely the kind of
immediate involvement unpopular at home – not least because of the traumatic experience
in Somalia, which major UN members were eager to avoid.6,7 The official rationale for the
decision not to jam provided by the US was, however, that radio jamming constitutes an act
of interference and thus a violation of international law, and the question of whether or not
such a ‘humanitarian’ media intervention could indeed have prevented massive violence 
continues to be a matter of controversy. 
In his account of the role of RTLM in the genocide, Jamie F. Metzl, a former UN Human
Rights Officer, traces the insistence on a position of non-interference to the Cold War and
wonders “whether the US Cold War interpretation of the international law of radio jamming
remains an appropriate standard in the post-Cold War world”.8 Metzl worries that “there is
a danger that, in a post-Somalia world less willing to respond forcefully to international
crises, the baby of information intervention will be thrown out with the bath water of armed
humanitarian intervention”, and makes the case for the creation of an independent 
information intervention unit under the auspices of the UN that could monitor local media 
in regions of conflict, offer ‘peace broadcasts’ to de-escalate a conflict, and intervene 
if need be, authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Security Council.9 While the commu-
nications-rights NGO Article 19 also supports the use of radio jamming in individual cases
and leaves no doubt that RTLM broadcasts should have been stopped once the genocide
began, it also cautions that such media interventions can never prevent ‘another Rwanda’,
since the genocide cannot be attributed exclusively to the influence of inflammatory 
media and would have continued with or without the support of RTLM.10 In her case 
study for another Article 19 report on state-sponsored violence, the political theorist 
Linda Kirsche notes that many accounts and analyses of the genocide tend to foreground
the role of inflammatory radio broadcasts in inciting the killing, even though “there is 
abundant evidence that the genocide was a carefully planned operation, directed by infor-
mal state networks against both Tutsi and moderate Hutu”, and cautions that exclusive
emphasis on the role of hate radio will “serve as an attempt to cover the lamentable failure
of the international community to heed the abundant warnings of impending disaster” and
thus re-localize a conflict that needs to be understood in translocal terms.11
While there has been almost unanimous agreement on the need to jam RTLM, it is less
obvious what should happen in other cases once the question of intervention becomes
unhinged from the extremism associated with the Rwandan genocide. The idea of ‘inter-
ventionist’ media is inextricably intertwined with the ongoing controversy over the criteria
used to identify the threshold for a ‘humanitarian’ intervention in general.12 Approached in
this context, interventionist media is always already on an imperial terrain, part of an impe-
rial project of governance not (only) because of the geopolitical ambition of the powers that
be, but because the complex contradictions of decolonization and the post-colonial order it
helped create, including the inability of weak and failing states to protect the human rights
of its own subjects, call for a conflict-analytical as well as media-theoretical response.
State Failure at the Edge of Empire
David Rieff, journalist and a sober observer of the practice of human rights, notes that most
‘humanitarian’ crises are not, in fact, humanitarian crises, but the by-product of civil wars
and massive state failure, and cautions that humanitarian intervention should never be
understood in terms of a selfless engagement: “So if we are going to intervene, let us
understand the project that we must engage in, which is not just humanitarian intervention,
nor even nation-building, but the de facto recolonization of some of the most unfortunate
parts of the world”.13 Rieff suggests that, “[I]t may not be politically correct to say so, but
there is a strong argument to be made that humanitarian interventions are positive for the
people of a Liberia or a Bosnia and negative for the US since, whatever the conspiracy 
theorists of the anti-globalizing left and the isolationist right imagine, such wars almost
never serve any geo-strategic or economic interest of the US or Western European 
powers”. Michael Ignatieff has commented on the contemporary moment of empire in 
similar, if even stronger, terms. For him, the acknowledgment that decolonization has failed
must be the point of departure for any politics of human rights: “The age of empire ought
to have been succeeded by an age of independent, equal and self-governing nation-states.
But that has not come to pass. America has inherited a world scarred not just by the 
failures of empires past but also by the failure of nationalist movements to create and
secure free states – and now, suddenly, by the desire of Islamists to build theocratic tyran-
nies on the ruins of failed nationalist dreams. ... The case for empire is that it has become,
in a place like Iraq, the last hope for democracy and stability alike”.14 In Empire Lite, a 
collection of essays on Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan originally published in The New
York Times Magazine, Ignatieff has been even more direct: “Empire used to be the White
Man’s Burden. But just because empire has become politically incorrect does not mean it
has become dispensable”.15 Such voices have often been dismissed as ‘hawkish’, offering
a narrative of humanitarian legitimation whose claim to universality has become tainted by
association with a geopolitical project of imperial expansion.16 What emerges, however, is
not so much (or not only) a naive view of empire often attributed to human rights activists
by an older anti-imperialist left, but a sense of the inescapability, even inevitability of a trans-
formation of the terrain on which the power of de-territorialized sovereignties is deployed. 
A 2003 NGO report on state failure suggests, “What is central to a failed state is
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that the state apparatus is unable to uphold an effective monopoly of violence over its
whole territory, lacks an effective judicial system to guard the rule of law and promulgate
judgements that are internationally regarded as legitimate and sound (especially in com-
mercial matters), is unable or unwilling to fulfil international obligations (such as in debt
repayment) and cannot prevent various forms of transnational economic crime or the use
of its territory for the perpetration of violence (politically motivated or otherwise) against
other states in the international system”.17 The report examines the respective roles
played by the colonial legacy and post-colonial state building, the end of Cold War, and
processes of socio-economic globalization, and concludes that “it would be misleading
to address failed or collapsed states merely as a temporary dysfunction of the Westphalia
inter-state order. State inability to supply basic public services like justice, health and 
educational systems is not anymore an anomaly in the ‘normal’ inter-state system (some-
thing to be solved through technical institutional and capacity-building strategies), rather,
it has become a structural trait of the contemporary international system” (ibid.). Few
have been willing to acknowledge that state failure is here to stay. Some “have begun to
take war into account in terms of development, but it is still considered a crisis and not
as part of the economic and political make-up of collapsed states’ societies, let alone as
a manifestation of the changing international system. ... It should be realized by policy-
makers that failed states, and particularly the ones that have collapsed, never return to
how they were prior to breaking down, even in the event that they do succeed in regain-
ing coherence after a period of failure (e.g. Uganda). What a post-state or other new 
entity will eventually become is one of the most important challenges facing the inter-
national system. ... Failed states, then, do not exist in isolation: they are an integral part
of the world system of governance” (ibid.). Consequently, “[S]tate failure is the pivotal
issue for explaining intra-state conflicts, the vulnerability of crisis countries to external
destabilization and continued obstacles to development”,18 and it offers a possible point
of departure for reflections on interventionist media.19
The ‘intractability’ of conflicts invoked to substantiate the claim that state failure is
really a failure of decolonization is, of course, itself in need of explanation. One of the
ironies of statist theories of international relations is that they cannot – or do not want to
– offer much analyses of either the stealth interventionism associated with ‘good gover-
nance’ and ‘trade liberalization’ or the complex dynamic of ethnicization that exposes the
common attribution of conflict to ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ to analytical ridicule. Because
the various brands of realist orthodoxy treat the state more or less as a ‘black box’,
unable to give an account of its often violent constitution as actor and geopolitical sub-
ject, they also have little to say on the topic of weak and failing states, let alone their
functionality in and indeed indispensability to various imperial projects. Instead, they envi-
sion a world with few stable states engulfed and threatened by a rising tide of non-state
actors, whose chaotic activity amounts to nothing less than a tribalist counter-modernity.
And while the attention to ‘ethnic conflict’ in the immediate post-Cold War era was widely
believed to call into question the neo-liberal triumphalism of the end of history that coin-
cided the arrival of Francis Fukayama on the stage of geopolitical commentary,
Fukayama’s controversial suggestion that all thought on the political will from now on be
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contained in the idea of a free-market-cum-liberal-democracy seems to be confirmed by
the specter of a statist modernity coming apart at its ex-colonial seams, calling into exis-
tence an imperial sovereignty based on these very principles.20
Conflict Analysis meets Interventionist Media
Statist and non-statist approaches do not, then, differ so much in their diagnosis of state
failure than in the account they offer of its emergence: an often presentist analytical inter-
nalism, even pathologization on the one hand, and translocal, historical, process-oriented
approaches on the other. While peace and conflict researchers have long been attentive to
the limits of an analytical statism,21 the field of conflict analysis itself has only recently
begun to address the way issues of media and representation in general complicate its
task. When the US-Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (CCPDC) “moved to
recognize this issue of the media and the information edge in conflict” in the 1990s, this
was applauded as exceptional yet long-overdue by the BBC journalist Nik Gowing. 
Gowing has written extensively on the complex relationship between media and con-
flict since the early 1990s.22 Following an early study that examined the common assump-
tion of a ‘CNN effect’, i.e. a direct link between increased conflict coverage and foreign 
policy action, one of his primary concerns has been the way the emergence of new 
media actors complicate the task of conflict analysis.23 In an influential report on the African
Great Lakes crisis in 1996-7, Gowing concludes that “there has been an important para-
digm shift in the principles of handling and managing information in conflict. Even modest
sub-regional forces from small, supposedly badly-resourced nations and factions have
learned and assimilated much of the latest thinking of information warfare, information con-
trol and information manipulation”.24 The easy availability and proliferation of communica-
tions technology has transformed the notion of media itself, no longer exclusively asso-
ciated with the institutions of official journalism but an ever-expanding network of media
makers. It is less obvious what ‘independence’ means when the state against which it could
be defined no longer, or not yet, exists, and as the role of hate radio in aggravating the
genocide in Rwanda suggests, the mix between state failure and (nominally) independent
media can be quite volatile.
Gowing’s work stands out because he worries about the mismatch between the 
“tyranny of real-time news” and the speed of political processes that articulate and autho-
rize possible responses, far from celebrating such a shift to an access-for-all information
regime in terms of a ‘tactical’ subversion of mainstream media. Instead, he carefully asses-
ses the troubling implications of circumventing official information management. As inter-
national media coverage becomes a symbolic resource for local actors, their clout and
leverage vis-à-vis a government concerned about its image abroad increase. Some events
take place only to generate their own representation, upsetting the traditional logic of con-
flict reporting as mere ‘witnessing of the truth’. And as Gowing notes in his contribution to
a forum on war and accountability organized by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, “[M]ost significantly, the bearing of witness in crises can now often be done not just
by journalists but by a whole new cadre of impromptu information ‘do-ers’, amateurs with
little or no training in the principles of good journalism – namely, balance, impartiality and
accuracy. A growing number are motivated advocates or partial campaigners who have
found low-cost, low-tech but highly effective ways firstly to record and then to distribute their
information and views in near real time”.25 Since news saturation and sheer overload might
cause stock images and interpretations to prevail, the proliferation of media ‘agents’
Gowing outlines complicates enormously the task of conflict analysis. So for better or
worse, it seems that ‘interventionist’ media theory will have to take at least some of its cues
from conflict analysis, preferably those approaches whose non-statist conceptual idiom is
capable of articulating the complex interdependencies Gowing outlines.26
In the late 1990s, the issue of media as an active force in the process of conflict man-
agement has received increasing attention, and various journalistic think tanks and human
rights organizations have created manuals on conflict and human rights reporting.27 While
many of these manuals continue to embrace the concept of objectivity, others share the
interventionist approach outlined by Robert Manoff of the US Centre for War, Peace and the
News Media: they turn the traditional approach to the media-conflict nexus around to ask
what it is conflict prevention and management require of the media. Among the various
approaches that already exist, Reporting the World (RTW) is most explicitly based on the
analytical apparatus of peace and conflict studies. Published by a UK journalism think-tank,
RTW incorporates a set of analytical principles from Conflict Transformation by Peaceful
Means, a manual published by the peace research centre Transcend, and prepared origi-
nally for the Crisis Environments Training Initiative and the Disaster Management Training
Programme of the United Nations.28 As Manoff notes, such propositions continue to be con-
troversial: “[I]n a number of countries, no single issue has so bedevilled the discussion of
Media & Conflict as the deeply held belief on the part of many journalists that the very idea
of media-based preventive action violates the norm of objectivity – whose corollary, disin-
terestedness with respect to the events being reported, is an essential element of the pro-
fessional creed. ... But whenever in recent years events such as the war in Bosnia or the
genocidal violence in Rwanda have provoked discussions concerning the role of the media,
the conversation-stopper has been the passionate assertion by senior correspondents 
that such concerns lie beyond the pale of legitimate journalism”.29 And even though it is 
far from promoting a simplistic sense of partisanship over and against the cherished 
journalistic principle of impartiality, RTW’s ‘peace journalism’ approach, too, continues to
generate controversy.30 
One of the consequences of such analyses might be the acknowledgment that the
separation between imperial and counter-imperial forms of interventionist media is not, or
no longer, easily made. David Rieff insists that to intervene is to take sides. But even more
so, to witness is to intervene; and the gaze of such interventionist media is inextricably inter-
twined with the ambiguities of empire. This is apparent, for example, in a 2003 report on
‘Media in Vulnerable Societies’ by Mark Frohardt, Africa Regional Director of the US com-
munications NGO Internews, and a former official with the United Nations Human Rights
Field Operation in Rwanda, and co-researcher Jonathan Temin that was published by the
United States Institute of Peace. Introducing an entire spectrum of possible media 
interventions that include radio jamming, but also the training of journalists, support for
independent media, and the monitoring of local media content, the report offers a 
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revealing definition of intervention: “The term ‘intervention’, as it is used here, does not
denote any sort of military or armed initiative (with one exception in the segment on ‘aggres-
sive interventions’). Rather, the term refers to support for the development of diverse, 
pluralistic independent media outlets giving voice to a variety of views and opinions. 
Such interventions are not carried out by soldiers or peacekeepers, but by journalists, 
professional media trainers, and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers”.31 Possible
media interventions are then divided into three categories: structural interventions (support
for independent media and diversity in media ownership, journalism training, legislative
interventions to protect private media outlets and address hateful and antagonistic content,
cooperation with international media networks as well as NGOs to complement and 
monitor local media), content-specific interventions (directly addressing the content 
produced by media outlets), and aggressive interventions (using force or prohibiting media
outlets from operating).
The assumption about what media constellation and content escalates or de-escalates
conflict must also – and necessarily – imagine a rather specific form of communicative
sociality, for example, and the comprehensive manual of such a media interventionism is
also a script of multicultural co-existence that is based, more or less, on the pluralistic pub-
lic sphere, sandwiched between state and market but never subsumed by them, that is sup-
posed to characterize liberal democracies. And without exception, the US serves as the
point of reference and paragon of a ‘really existing’ media pluralism. This is, of course, the
report’s main assumption: a society that does not have a pluralistic media is, by definition,
more vulnerable to conflict. One could also draw the conclusion, however, that the absence
of major social contestation in the US is in no small part related to the particular structure
of its mediascape, and that the unquestioned invocation of these structures as point of ref-
erence for other non-conflictual public spheres raises a host of questions regarding, for
example, the future structures of ownership in vulnerable societies: the privatization of state
media is no longer legitimized in economic but in conflict-analytical terms. And yet, the inter-
ventionist gaze of humanitarian surveillance the report envisions appears to remain neutral,
untroubled by the need to explore its own locatedness vis-à-vis the space in which it aims
to intervene.
I am not suggesting that the report does, in any way, support specific foreign or trade
policy objectives. On the contrary, its focus on media interventions is a most welcome con-
tribution to the de-militarization of the logic of humanitarian intervention. But its logic reso-
nates with other projects of global governance that are, in turn, related to the issue of state
failure. It is here that theoretical approaches to ‘interventionist’ media need to link up with
conflict-analytical work. The report seems to approach intervention as neutral in the sense
that the emergence of conflict is what authorizes the intervention on behalf of a general
humanitarian concern that is itself left unexplored: conflict is just not a good thing.
Ultimately, the report, it seems to me, reproduces the Hobbesian assumptions of main-
stream conflict analysis. But what constitutes conflict, and who is to judge the desirability
of any one conflict over another, cannot be answered by a just-say-no-to-conflict approach,
and the question of which kind of conflict analysis is to ground the broad array of media
interventions is indeed crucial. Coverage cannot solve the question of what comes after
information, and one of the fallacies of an interventionist journalism might be that it sub-
sumes the necessarily contentious politics under ‘better’ coverage and ‘better’ protocols 
of conflict analysis. This is where ‘best practice’ expertism creeps in even in the case of
‘counter-imperial’ human rights journalism, reflecting in an odd way the techno-determinist
faith that open media will necessarily give voice to those who suffer and deserve our sup-
port the most. Human rights journalism that follows ‘best practice’ anticipates a post-
conflict ‘public sphere’ where actors follow certain scripts of civic co-existence, and as long
as both local and trans-local reporting followed ‘best practice’ in its coverage of human
rights issues, how could the emergence of the corresponding multiethnic civil society
implied in these protocols possibly be jeopardized? But what if they do not? What role does
genuine incommensurability play in these scripts that all-too-often follow a logic of diversity
and a tolerant mutuality? Local journalism, an important element of the much celebrated 
re-emergence of ‘civil society’, is centrally linked to the work of transnational non-state
actors like Internews, and such ‘subaltern’ views are likely to be affected by the protocols
of an international human rights journalism. Internews claims, for example, that it “uses the
media to reduce conflict within and between countries”. This is a rather sweeping claim, and
if conflict journalism and conflict analysis are as closely intertwined as I am suggesting, it
matters which conceptual and historical assumptions regarding the genesis of conflict feed
back into local and trans-local human rights reporting.
One might also object that one of the countries where the media is likely to aggravate
conflict along pre-meditated vectors of escalation is the US itself, as became evident in the
belligerence of mainstream coverage of the Iraq crisis and a corresponding meekness in
relationship to what critics have called the Official Sources Industry. Commenting on the 
militarized expertism that characterized much network coverage, for example, the inde-
pendent journalist Amy Goodman contends that CNN et al were already giving the concept
of ‘general news’ an entirely new meaning.32 But rather than focusing on the contradictions
of such a media pluralism, what is important to me in this context is that the implied focus
(and site of deployment) of any and all media interventions appears to be an imaginary
abroad, understood in terms of a social volatility that renders it open to outside interven-
tion. Such an approach might, as Kirsche suggest in the case of the RTLM, encourage a 
re-localization of conflict that obscures the role played by non-local actors. While I share the
assumption of the Internews/USIP report that “robust independent media can play a critical
watchdog role in societies vulnerable to civil conflict, but that the capacity of underdeve-
loped media to resist insidious abuse and manipulation is often limited”, the interventionist
localism of its approach to the question of ‘vulnerability’ says very little about the need 
to challenge mainstream references to ‘ancient tribal hatreds’, for example, that contribute
their own share to the stabilization of a conflict in local terms and the reluctance to 
organize a humanitarian intervention.
The Internews report is, I think, a good example of the irreducible imperial ambiguity of
any kind of ‘interventionist’ media. A key player in the ‘official’ US politics of media intervention,
Internews receives almost four-fifths of its funding from USAID and the US State Department
and might be an all-too-easy target of criticism.33 Similarly, the faith of its director that US-
sponsored media initiatives might “bring the light of free speech to places that breed terrorism”
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can be dismissed as the arrogant voice of a new imperial mission.34 But while Internews cele-
brates its cold-war origins, such networks do not constitute a post-Cold War Congress for
Cultural Freedom, and the open-society idiom it employs is already shifting from an older anti-
totalitarian statism that used to serve as foil for the concept of independent media in an open
society, not least in response to the question of media in ‘vulnerable’ societies’.35 And yet, 
if state failure is taken seriously, the project of a NGO-sponsored media pluralism rooted in 
local ‘civil society organizations’, shared even by ‘peace media’ organizations like the 
Hirondelle Foundation,36 might still fail if the (teleological) assumption of statist normalcy serves
to stabilize the construction of a pluralist mediasphere.
Interventionist Media on New Terrain
For better or worse, interventionist media will operate on imperial terrain, and in this con-
text, media theory can no longer ignore the imperial implications of weak, collapsing, or
failed states. Empire is not, of course, merely a consequence of the ‘failure’ of the con-
ceptual and geopolitical agenda of third worldism, of its project of tri-continental liberation,
and of a new world economic order. On the contrary, Empire is itself the ambiguous 
consequence of a multitude of social struggles whose logic of self-organization is 
markedly different from the logic of sovereignty imagined in Bandung, and it still remains
necessary to articulate alternative genealogies of Empire, and indeed reclaim the concept
of Empire itself.37 But this is also where the question of an interventionist media arises, chal-
lenging the re-localization of conflict encouraged by the conceptual idiom of statist ortho-
doxy by drawing on trans-local approaches to conflict analysis. 
It is in this context, sketched all-too-briefly, that I have come to wonder – a question I
have, not an assumption I am making – whether the various ‘subversive’ concepts of
autonomous, interventionist and tactical media also depend on the assumption of a strong
state, and whether there is a need to examine the (constitutive) assumption that such inter-
ventions are part of a counter-imperial dynamic of multitudinal self-organization. I am not
suggesting that the post-colonial in general is somehow absent from media-theoretical
reflection. Quite the contrary, the ‘info warriors’ and ‘communication guerrillas’ in the idiom
of contemporary (metropolitan) media activism continue to refer to the anti-colonial strug-
gles of an earlier era and serve as – often unexplored – markers of post-coloniality. Even
the “ABC of Tactical Media” by David Garcia and Geert Lovink, an attempt to offer an alter-
native media aesthetics that is ambiguous enough to approach analytically even the kind of
media usage characteristic of the RTLM, acknowledges the centrality of such martial
metaphorics by both mobilizing and mocking it: “Tactical media do not just report events,
as they are never impartial, they always participate and it is this that more than anything
separates them from mainstream media. ... But once the enemy has been named and van-
quished it is the tactical practitioner whose turn it is to fall into crisis”.38 Having lost its sub-
versive innocence in the gruesome, unexpected literality that characterized the media-
orchestrated genocide in Rwanda, it seems to me now that it is the idea of interventionist
media itself that is called into question. And one way to approach something like a rethink-
ing of this idea is to acknowledge that state failure, and the deterritorialization of violence
that this implies, is indeed a permanent feature of the post-colonial era. 
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